Original Reviews

          The idea of ‘civilizing’ warfare may appear to be an oxymoron. But efforts to do just that date back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Lawrence Rockwood’s interesting discussion covers both jus ad bellum – the decision to engage in military action, and jus in bellum - the conduct of the armies, both individual fighting men and the command structure. He is most interested in jus in bellum and particularly commander responsibility. We are “walking away from Nuremberg” in that we have abandoned principles upheld by the International Military Tribunal (1945-46) which tried German military and civil leaders.

          The U.S. has made an important contributor in formulating the rules of war. Rockwood argues that “General Order No. 100,” issued in 1863 by the Lincoln Administration in the midst of the Civil War, has become the basis for a body of international law on the conduct of war and command responsibility.

          “General Order No. 100,” among other issues, dealt with categories of participants and how they should be treated. Prisoners of war who had not committed criminal acts should be treated humanly, as circumstances allowed and not executed. In the case of escapees, firing on them was permitted, but not their execution. On the other hand, deserters, spies, traitors, those who failed to give quarter, or killed the injured could be executed. There was a special category for pickets, sharpshooters (Civil War) and snipers, who were often more summarily treated. The taking and shooting of civilian hostages and other forms of reprisal were permitted, but there must be some proportionality. Unclear was how one should treat civilians who in various ways were contributing to the success of an army.

          In 1944 a conversation began about how we should deal with German military commanders, Nazi party leaders, and administrators at war’s end. They had engineered the killing of millions of non-combatants and PoWs. Winston Churchill and others advocated summary execution when captured. However, the proposals for post-war trials had the support of our War Department. It was agreed to create an International Military Tribunal.

          Rockwood is not impressed with Tribunal’s deliberation. For example, Admiral Karl Doenitz, commander of the German navy, was tried and convicted of waging unrestricted submarine warfare. This despite Admiral Chester Nimitz’s testifing that our submarine warfare was similar in character. Allied troops had also shot prisoners of war. American and British aerial bombardment of German cities had killed thousands of German non-combatants. Nuremberg, Rockwood claims, has the appearance of a victor’s justice.

          That seems even more so in view of the American response to the My Lai massacre in Vietnam in 1968. Those fighting an insurgency had not generally been mentioned in discussions of jus in bellum. To win against the Viet Cong, we would have to destroy their support in the countryside. Lieutenant William Calley’s army outfit was ordered to burn suspect villages, destroy their crops, and poison their wells. Calley ultimately claimed that he was also instructed by his immediate commander, Captain Ernest Medina, to kill “suspected insurgents.”

           Rockwood’s unsympathetic views agreed with a later military investigating committee which issued its damaging report to a stunned America in March 1970. The investigation happened because General William Westmoreland, then Chief of Staff in the Nixon Administration, insisted that the killings be looked into. Even though Congress, the Nixon White House, and veteran associations had little enthusiasm for court marshaling soldiers accused of war crimes in Vietnam. Calley was convicted but soon pardoned, and the other three dozen soldiers charged were never brought to trial.

          Most significant, according to Rockwood, the military judge and jury exonerated Captain Ernest Medina, Calley’s commanding officer. He claimed that he knew nothing about Calley’s action, even though he was circling above in a helicopter and landed several times during the operation. Thus Medina and we walked away from command responsibility for upholding principles established at Nuremberg.